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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NEW MEXICO'S NATIONAL FORESTS AND THE
IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE

Since Arizona vs. California,' countless pages have heralded a
great Federal-State conflict over the waters in the West. The source
of conflict is the implied reservation doctrine, which has merited
specific analysis in at least three recent major studies, 2 and has been
the catalyst for several unsuccessful Congressional bills.3 The conflict, if one believes all that has been written, is between fervent state
engineers who castigate this potential federal encroachment on private and state water rights, and federal bureaucrats who envision
grandiose plans with their newfound source of power. Actually, the
conflict thus far has been more imagined than real, but that is not to
say that the conflict does not exist. One can sense federal and state
agencies preparing for the ultimate confrontation.
The principal federal agency affecting New Mexico water rights is
the Forest Service. This comment will focus on the implied reservation doctrine and Forest Service water uses vis-a-vis New Mexico
water law. The New Mexico State Engineer steadily attacks the
implied reservation rights that are claimed for New Mexico's National
Forests. Both the State Engineer and the Forest Service claim a
better right to the use of an increasingly scarce and valuable resource;
proponents on both sides are prone to emotionalism and exaggeration. This comment, like so many others before it, attempts a rational analysis of the issue.
As early as 1911 one noted authority predicted, perhaps unwittingly, the conflict that currently envelops litigation over water rights
in the Southwest:
1. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
2. National Water Commission, Water Policies For The Future, Final Report to the
President and to the Congress of the United States, ch. 13 (1973), [hereinafter cited asNWC
Final Report] ; F. Trelease, Federal-StateRelations In Water Law, National Water Commission, Legal Study No. 5, pt. V (1971) [hereinafter cited as Trelease, NWCStudyl ; and, U.S.
Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land, A Report to the
President and to the Congress, ch. 8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC, One Third of the
Nation's Land].
3. E.g., the Moss Bill, S. 28, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); the Hosmer Bill, H.R. 2312,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); and the Kuchel Bill, S. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
The first two are verbatim reiterations of the Kuchel Bill, which is a moderate version of the
Barret Bill, S. 863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). For an excellent discussion of legislation up
to 1966, see, Morreale, Federal-State Conflict over Western Waters-A Decade of A ttempted
"ClarifyingLegislation," 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 423 (1966).
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The Federal system here considered is just developing. . . In any
event, it leaves room for much conflict between the Forest Service
and the State Engineer and the general State water administrations .... In this matter, as throughout the policy of conservation,
the conflict between State and Federal jurisdiction ... is becoming
marked; and the law is in an uncertain and formative stage. 4
This statement accurately reflects the present state of the law in the
area of Federal-State relations, sixty-five years later. Particularly in
New Mexico, the issue of implied reservation rights is critical-the
conflict has become marked, and the law is in an uncertain and
formative stage.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
New Mexico, like most of the western states, has abandoned the
riparian doctrine of the water-rich East, and has formally adopted
the doctrine of prior appropriation of water rights-the Colorado
Doctrine.' Prior appropriation grew of necessity in the arid West,
where it is vital that owners have access to the scarce water supplies.
The doctrine was accepted by the courts6 prior to its formalization
in the 1907 statutes7 and the New Mexico Constitution.8
New Mexico shares the same basic elements of appropriative water
law as the other appropriation states. The first is that beneficial use is
the basis of the right to use water, 9 as opposed to the riparian basis
of land ownership and reasonable use. Secondly, the appropriator
must establish dominion over a definite quantity of water, which is
measured by beneficial use. This dominion is generally established by
diversion of water. In New Mexico, man-made works are required to
divert water for irrigation purposes.' ' Thirdly, the potential water
user must intend to appropriate and pursue the diversion of water
with diligence. The next element is that notice must be given to
other users or potential users.' ' The fifth element is that water
rights are ranked in a system of priority in time, i.e., senior rights are
protected over junior rights.' 2 Full protection is given the first use
before the second use, and so on, in times of shortage. The date of
4. S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, § 442 (3rd ed. 1911).
5. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
6. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 9 N.M. 292, 306-307, 51 P. 674
(1898), iev'd. on other grounds, 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-1 (1953).
8. N.M. Const. art. 16, § 1-3.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-2 (1953).
10. State ex. rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972).

11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-2.1 (1953).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-1-2 (1953).
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the priority is the date when the first step is taken to appropriate
water. Although the water may be put to beneficial use at a later date,
the right is said to "relate back" to that first step. The sixth element
1 I Finally, a
is that the water right is transferable and forfeitable.
14
system of administration is provided by the State.
THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE
The Property Clause and Other ConceptualBases
A brief explanation of the implied reservation doctrine is necessary. Federal power over Western water has been found in the
commerce clause, the supremacy clause and the property clause of
the United States Constitution, and sometimes in a combination
thereof. The Public Land Law Review Commission has concluded:
As successor to the sovereigns from which the United States obtained the vast areas of the western public domain, the Federal
Government by the mid-19th century possessed complete power
over the land and water of that region. Because the courts have
settled the issue, there is little to be gained in academic arguments as
to whether that power derives from concepts of "ownership" as
distinguished from "sovereignty": the power is plenary, whatever its
conceptual basis.' 5
Yet, no explanation is given by the Commission for those vested
pre-19th century water rights existing at the time the United States
became sovereign, a concern that has been discussed by a noted New
Mexico proponent of State water rights.' 6 Further, to make such a
sweeping conclusion is to underestimate the proprietary role of the
United States. Until the development of the implied reservation doctrine, the Western states were believed to have acquired any proprietary interests the Federal Government had.
The property clause of the United States Constitution states:
The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or
1
of any particular State. 7
13. First State Bank v. McNew, 33 N.M. 414, 269 P. 56 (1928); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 75-5-26 (1953).
14. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-1 (Supp. 1975), with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-8
and 75-2-9 (1953).
15. PLLRC, One Third of the Nation's Land, at 141.
16. Bloom, Indian "Paramount"Rights to Water Use, 16 Rocky Mt. MI. L. Inst. 669
(1971). Contra, Veeder, Indian Prior and "Paramount" Rights To The Use of Water, 16
Rocky Mt. MI. L. Inst. 631 (1971).
17. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3(2).
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If, as the Public Land Law Review has so found, the Federal
Government possessed complete ownership over the land and water
of the western region, then it would have had to subsequently dispose of those lands in order to grant title to the western states. On
the other hand, if pre-19th century rights existed at the time the
Federal Government came into possession, or if the Federal Government subsequently granted away the right to use the water over
much of the public domain, then valid claims exist which cannot be
prejudiced by other Constitutional provisions such as the supremacy
clause or the commerce clause. The problem is that since much of
the public domain was subsequently disposed of through major congressional acts, it was assumed that the non-navigable water rights
were also disposed of.
The Homestead Act of 1866'8 seemed to grant authority to the
States to determine what water uses should become vested rights.
The Act provided, among other things, that:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws and the decisions of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
same, and the rights of way for the construction of ditches and
canals for.. the
' 9 purposes herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed;.
The Act was amended in 1870 by adding the following:
All patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be
subject to any vested and accrued water-rights, or rights to ditches
and reservoirs used in connection with such water-rights, as may
20
have been acquired under or recognized by the preceding section.
Finally, the Desert Land Act of 18772 1 stated:
... and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation
and use, together with the water of all, [sic] lakes, rivers, and other
sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable,
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the
public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to
existing rights. 22
18. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1965) (corresponds to Act of July 26, 1866, c. 262, § 9, 14 Stat.
253).
19. Id.
20. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1965) (corresponds to Act of July 9, 1870, c. 235, § 17, 16 Stat.

218).

21. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1965) (corresponds to Act of March 3, 1877, c. 107, § 1, 19 Stat.
377).
22. Id.
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The Supreme Court, in 1935, had an opportunity to discuss the
Desert Land Act and concluded: "What we hold is that following the
act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the
public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of
the designated states."'2 The Court further held that each state had
the right to determine to what extent the law of appropriation or the
law of riparianism applied.
Not until 1955 did the Supreme Court suggest to the Western
appropriators that the above discussed Acts were "not applicable to
the reserved lands," 2 4 but only to public lands. Apparently the
broad grant of water rights which seemed to have been given to the
Western States did not include those for lands reserved from the
public domain. Previously, in Winters v. United States,2 the Court
had established Indian reserved rights, but that was considered a
unique water rights resolution not applicable to non-Indian federal
land. The effect of excluding reserved lands from operation of the
Acts is reflected in a recent study:
Nearly 700 million acres of the original public domain, lands that
were never transferred from Federal ownership, remain as part of
our public lands. Over 179 million acres of public domain have been
reserved as national parks and national forests. Some, approximately
other
53.5 million acres,
2 have been set aside for specific uses by ...
Federal agencies. 6
Apparently, the proprietary powers of the Federal Government,
long since considered relinquished to the Western States, were revived by the Pelton Dam decision.2 7 However questions remain. Are
water rights included within that "property" belonging to the United
States and protected by the property clause? Has water on reserved
land not been "severed from the land(?) ' 2 1 Did the reservation doctrine truly grow out of the property clause?
Walter Kiechel, Jr., of the Department of Justice, seems to have
resolved these questions affirmatively, in favor of Federal Government ownership:
The right to use that water was and is one of the whole bundle
...
23. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64

(1935).
24. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955), commonly referred
to as the Pelton Dam decision.

25. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
26. PLLRC, One Third of the Nation's Land, at 19-20.
27. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
28. 295 U.S. at 158, wherein the Court interpreted the Desert Land Act as having
"effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated,
from the land itself."
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of rights acquired by the United States when it acquired ownership
of the lands....
Once the United States' ownership of the right to use the waters
upon, within, and adjacent to the public domain which have not
previously been appropriated by others under authority of an act of
Congress is recognized, there really is no mystery about the reserved
rights doctrine. It simply means that when public lands are withdrawn or reserved for authorized purposes requiring the use of
water, the right to use a sufficient amount of the unappropriated
waters pertaining thereto to accomplish those purposes is also reserved. 2 9 (Emphasis added.)
For some, the mystery remains.
Some Background Case History
At least one noted water law expert 30 has argued that the presentday reservation doctrine had its beginnings in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Company. 3 1 That case dealt with the
problem created when an irrigation company, authorized by state
law, diminished the navigability of the Rio Grande River. At the
company's diversion location the river was non-navigable; its effect
was downstream. The Court relied on the supremacy doctrine, in
creating a "navigation servitude" to limit state action, and stated that
absent Congressional authority, "a State cannot by its legislation
destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government prop3
erty." 2
Professor Trelease argues that the supremacy clause is the basis for
the reservation doctrine, and that Rio Grande is a restatement of that
supremacy power. He has also concluded:
It is thus very clear from a reading of the Supreme Court opinions
that the reservation doctrine does not depend upon theories of
federal ownership of water, faulty interpretations of statutes and
false history. The results would have been the same if the Acts of
1866 and 1877 had never been enacted, and nothing would change if
those acts were repealed today. Reserved water rights stem from the
supremacy clause and the need for water to carry out federal functions. The power to make such reservations cannot be doubted, and
29. W. Kiechel Jr., Inventory and Quantification of Federal Water Rights-A Common

Denominator of Proposalsfor Change, 8 Nat. Res. L. 255, 256 (1975). See United States v.
Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 235 (1960).
30. Trelease, NWC Study, at 147k.

31. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
32. Id. 703.
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they can be created by any form of notice of intent to use unap-

federal purpose on any lands
propriated water for any 3contemplated
3
in any state of the union.
The evolution of the reservation doctrine continued in the much
discussed Winters case. 3 4 The Court again relied on the supremacy
doctrine and held that through creation of an Indian reservation, the
federal government impliedly reserved water enough to develop the
reservation. Further, the priority date established was the same date
as creation of the reservation (1888), regardless of the time when
Indian uses actually began. The effect was that post-reservation, nonIndian state-created uses were now junior to these Indian uses which
began later.3 s
The doctrine was slowly expanded to include non-Indian reserved
lands as well. In the 1955 Pelton Dam case, 3 6 the Supreme Court
upheld the Federal Power Commission's grant of a license to a private power company which sought to build a dam across the Deschutes River in Oregon, over state protests. Both sides of the river
were bounded by federal lands-an Indian reservation on one side
and a power site reservation on the other. Oregon unsuccessfully
relied on the Desert Land Act of 18771 " as authority for its position
that non-navigable waters were severed from public lands and subjected to state control. As discussed above, the Court distinguished
reservations from public lands, the latter being those lands open for
disposition to the public. Relying on the property clause of the
Constitution, the Court held that the Federal Government could
issue the license without state approval. However, under the facts,
the decision did not necessitate impairment of water rights created
by state law.
The first actual allocation of water for federal reserved non-Indian
lands occurred in Arizona v. California,3 8 a 1963 decision. The
United States intervened in a multi-state suit to claim water for
Indian reservations as well as other reserved federal lands. The Court
dealt with the Indian lands, relying on Winters, by reiterating the
doctrine of implied reservation of water on Indian reservations and
quantifying the water rights as the amount necessary for irrigation of
their "practicably irrigable" lands. The Court extended the implied
33. Trelease, NWCStudy, at 1471
34. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
35. Perhaps Winters should be viewed strictly as an Indian water rights case, considering
United States reservation policy and the implications of a treaty situation. Also, as to
appropriation dating, see authorities cited supra note 16.
36. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).

37. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1965).
38. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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reservation doctrine to include, "other federal establishments such as
National Recreation Areas and National Forests," 3" but they did not
quantify these non-Indian uses. Among these other federal establishments was the Gila National Forest in New Mexico. Further, the
Court states that, "We have no doubt about the power of the United
States under these clauses [the commerce clause and the property
clause] to reserve water rights for its reservations and its
property."' I
There have been recent footnotes to the implied reservation
doctrine involving Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. District Court in andfor the County of Eagle,4 ' the Court held that the
McCarran Amendment' 2 allowed a state court to adjudicate federal
water rights established under the implied reservation doctrine,
though the case could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The "or
otherwise" clause of the McCarran Amendment was construed to
include reserved water rights, and the United States no longer had to
initiate the adjudication in order to litigate reserved water rights. The
Court stated that the "federally reserved lands include any federal
enclave.... The reservation of waters may be implied and their
amount will reflect the nature of the federal enclave." ' (Emphasis
added.) In a companion case, United States v. District Court in and
for Water Division No. 5,44 the water rights involved were said to
include those of four separate National Forests. Further, a new Colo39.
40.
41.
42.
§ 208

Id. 601.
Id. 598.
United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970) (corresponds to Act of July 10, 1952, c. 651, Title 1I,
(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560):
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a
party to such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that
the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit.
In State ex. rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976), the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the United States, as "owner" of reserved Indian water rights,
could be joined as a defendant in general stream adjudications in State courts under the
McCarran Amendment. The case involved reserved water rights of the Mescalero Apache
Indian Reservation.

43. 401 U.S. at 523.
44. United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 520 (1971).
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rado procedure was determined sufficient service of process on the
United States.
In another Colorado case, the United States as trustee for certain
Indian tribes and as owner of various non-Indian government claims,
brought an action in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado to adjudicate waters and tributaries in Water Division
No. 7. One of the defendants in the federal action filed a state court
action seeking an order directing service of process on the Government for the purpose of adjudicating all of the United States' claims;
subsequently, several defendants and intervenors in the federal proceeding moved the District Court to dismiss on the ground that
under the McCarran Amendment the court had no jurisdiction to
determine federal water rights. The District Court granted the
motion, ruling that the doctrine of abstention required deference to
the state court proceedings and failing to resolve the jurisdictional
issue. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, in United States
v. Akin,4 holding that abstention was inappropriate and that the
action was within the Federal District Court's jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1345, which gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions commenced by the United States,
"[el xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress." The fear of a
"race to the courthouse" was dismissed as groundless.4 6
The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, reversed the
Tenth Circuit judgment and affirmed the District Court's judgment
dismissing the complaint. 4 The Court held that the McCarran
Amendment was not an exception "provided by Act of Congress,"
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1345. Thus the District Court had jurisdiction under § 1345 over the action brought by the United States.
Further, although the abstention doctrine was held inapplicable, the
court listed several factors that counseled against concurrent federal
proceedings, the most important of which was the clear federal
policy behind the McCarran Amendment against piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.
Notably, the Supreme Court reiterated a safeguard mentioned in
Eagle County. The Court, quoting from Eagle County, stated that,
"questions [arising from the collision of private rights and reserved
rights of the United States], including the volume and scope of
particular reserved rights, are federal questions which, if preserved,
45. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd. 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
46. 504 F.2dat 121.
47. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.
483 (1976).
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can be reviewed [by the Supreme Court] after final judgment by the
Colorado court."' 8
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recently held that the United States may
also reserve underground water as well as surface water.4 9
The Doctrine Summarized and ProblemsPresented
One study found six variations of the implied reservation doctrine.' 0 However, certain basic tenets of the doctrine which pervade
the various interpretations can be established.
If a federal enclave has been established by treaty, act of Congress,
or executive order for a federal purpose which will require water at
some date, present or future, and if at the time of establishment the
federal government intended to reserve unappropriated water for
that purpose, then enough water to fulfill that purpose is reserved
from appropriation by private users under state law, assuming that
unappropriated water in sufficient amounts is available. Thus if and
when water is put to use by a federal enclave, its right is senior to
those private rights acquired after the date of the enclave establishment even though those private rights have been put to beneficial
use. Private rights vesting after the reservation date and impaired or
destroyed by Federal use need not be compensated for by the
Federal Government, since no harm will be done under the concept
that priority in time is priority in right.
It is speculative at this date whether the federal reservation water
rights are limited to those uses contemplated at the time of the
reservation. The language in Eagle County indicates that the amount
5
of water reserved, "will reflect the nature of the federal enclave."
Some questions remain. Does "nature" mean "purpose"? What is the
"nature" of a National Forest? And do water uses that weren't contemplated at the time of the reservation share the same date of
appropriation as the time of the water's first use?
Further, in light of Winters and Arizona, the doctrine is not
limited to the water arising on the enclave; uses involved in both
cases were from rivers upstream from the reservation. Whether this is
problematic, as it pertains to the Forest Service, is uncertain, since
most National Forests are at the top of watersheds. Whether a claim
to water arising outside of the watershed will be sustained is also not
48. Id. 1244.
49. United States v. Cappaert, S08 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S.
1041 (1975).
50. Wheatley & Corker, Study of the Development, Management, and Use of Water
Resources on the Public Lands, Public Land Law Review Commission (1969).
51. 401 U.S. at 523.
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definite. Resolution of that issue is guided only by vague language
addressing appurtenantcy. As far as New Mexico National Forests are
concerned, 5sufficient water can be obtained from watersheds within
each Forest. 2
Finally, after Arizona and the subsequent reservation cases, one
wonders whether federal use is limited to use on those lands riparian
to the waterflow. Can the water only be used on the lands appurtenant to the stream, or may it be diverted from reservation to reservation, or from reservation to private land? This problem has more
effect on Indian reservations. Forest uses are limited to the lands
close to the waterflow. Any diversion is to land within the Forest
and riparian to the stream. Special use permits for private and State
use are also similarly restricted.
NEW MEXICO AND FOREST SERVICE WATER RIGHTS
Vital Statistics
Federal lands provide 61% of the total natural runoff in the 11
coterminous western states.5 3 Forest Service and National Park Service lands contribute about 96% of the runoff from public lands, and
5
approximately 59% of the total yield from all lands in those states. 4
Approximately 18.2 million acres, or 23% of the total land area, in
New Mexico are forested.5 I Of that acreage, approximately 9.0
million acres, or 11% of the total land area in New Mexico, is National Forest.5 6 The National Forests in New Mexico are included in
Region 3 of the National Forest system, with headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
National Forests in New Mexico contribute approximately 1.8
million acre-feet of the total New Mexico water yield. The present
Forest use in New Mexico is 3215.41 acre feet per year.5 I The
projected Forest use is expected to increase to an additional 3392.76
8
acre-feet per year, by the year 2000. 1
The National Forests in New Mexico consist of the Apache, Carson, Cibola, Coronado, Gila, Lincoln and Santa Fe. The breakdown
52. Interview with Region 3 Hydrologists, United States Forest Service, Department of
Agriculture, in Albuquerque, November 3, 1975.
53. PLLRC, One Third of the Nation'sLand, at 141.
54. Id.
55. Choate, New Mexico's Forest Resource, U.S. Forest Service Resource Bull. INT-5, iii

(1966).
56. Interview with Region 3 Hydrologists, supra note 52.
57. Id. 1975 compilations. Because the figures are based on millions of Region-wide
individual uses they are subject to error and are not intended as absolutely reliable figures,
particularly the projected use figures.

58. Id.
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of approximate present water contribution, present water use, and
projected additional use per forest is as follows:' 9
Projected
Yield
Present Use
Additional Use
Forest
(acre-feet)
(acre-feet)
(acre-feet)
Apache
400,000
230
235
Carson
425,000
350
365
Cibola
120,000
395
35
Coronado
90,000
90
30
Gila
310,000
1,160
1,695
Uncoln
120,000
690
585
Santa Fe
410,000
300
450
Totals
1,875,000
3,220
3,395
In short, the present Forest uses in New Mexico total approximately 0.21% of their yield, while the projected total use will be
0.44% of their yield. The Region 3 statistics also indicate that Forest
uses are 1.00% of all State uses, while the projected uses will be
approximately 1.50-2.00% of all State uses.
These statistics are not intended to suggest that because the Forest
Service uses such a small proportion of its total water yield, and of
the State total use, that its uses should go unquestioned. They serve
merely to provide a reference by which the reader may attain some
perspective of the actual scope of the reservation doctrine and its
application in New Mexico.
The Conflict
The National Water Commission determined that a reserved
federal water right has certain characteristics
... which are quite incompatible with state appropriation water
law: (1) it may be created without diversion or beneficial use, (2) it
is not lost by nonuse, (3) its priority dates from the time of the land
withdrawal, and (4) the measure of the right is the amount of water
reasonably necessary
to satisfy the purposes for which the land has
60
been withdrawn.
Another characteristic can possibly be added at this point: (5) the
Federal Government does not have to pay compensation for those
private rights it divests which have a later appropriation date. With
that addition we have the core of the controversy surrounding the
implied reservation doctrine.
59. Id.
60. NWC, FinalReport, at 464.
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In most cases since 1963, federal agencies have continued to
comply with state regulations, perhaps as a matter of comity. In
some cases federal agencies have adopted positions in disregard of
State law. The Forest Service Manual, reflecting a 1965 rewording,
indicates that water, including instream flows and standing water for
reserved lands, "will be obtained and used in accordance with the
reservation principle." 6 I For acquired lands, water rights have been
obtained under state law, through appropriation or purchase.
A. Diversion and Beneficial Use
One interesting problem raised by Forest Service use in New
Mexico is that of beneficial use, the basis of the right to use water in
the State. A Forest use might not be considered as a beneficial use
under New Mexico law, or if recognized, may be low in priority.
How valuable, for example, do New Mexicans consider weekend ski
trips or picnics? Perhaps a lease for a ski resort, a recreational water
site, or a campground development will affect certain private water
rights vested under New Mexico law.
For the most part, the presently projected uses are for: stock
water for cattle on grazing permits; special use permits other than
grazing; the irrigation of nurseries; domestic uses, at guard stations
and maintenance sites; the maintenance of timber management
roads; recreation uses, domestic and other; fire-fighting; and wildlife
preservation. There are no innovative or theoretically possible uses
such as the highly unlikely Region 6 plan for timber irrigating to
increase yield.6 2 However, as Frank Trelease has pointed out, "even
the small uses contemplated . . . will not come off the top of a 363
million acre foot tank,"' 6 3 stressing the point that in a particularized,
localized situation the reservation use may indeed affect established
rights. That is, a New Mexico rancher could be economically affected
when his alfalfa crop needs water that is taken by the Forest Service
from a low stream in late summer.
The only actual case involving an impaired private right by the use
of an implied reservation right is that of Glenn v. United States,6 4 an
unreported 1963 decision. In Glenn, the plaintiff sought $25,000 in
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the Ashley National Forest in Utah supposedly took water from Bear Creek to
supply a campground, which in turn impaired the plaintiff's domestic
61. Forest Service Manual, Title 2500-Watershed Management, c. 2540, § 2541.03

(1965).
62. Interview with Region 3 Hydrologists, supra note 52.

63. Trelease, NWC Study at 120.
64. Glenn v. United States, Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah 1963).
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use. Actually, the spring from which the Forest Service took the
water had no visible effect on the Bear Creek domestic use, and in
fact Forest Service officials did not know that the campground was
in the same drainage. At any rate, the reservation doctrine was relied
upon to defeat the claim. I
Assuming diversion of water is also required for an appropriative
right to vest,6 6 some Forest Service uses may not require diversion.
An example of such use, discussed later, is the maintenance of certain levels of instream flows to preserve fish life and stream quality.
In such case the Forest Service is not physically impounding the
water. The use is non-consumptive, and the determination of
whether it is a beneficial use would seem to be the guiding principle.
In New Mexico, recreational uses and the preservation of fish for
fishing purposes have been recognized as beneficial uses. 6 7 Such uses
require no diversion and are non-consumptive. However uses such as
this are generally low in preference and may not always be recognized as a beneficial use.
The implied reservation doctrine is at odds with the concepts of
beneficial use and diversion of water, as is pointed out by the National Water Commission study cited above. To reserve an indeterminable amount of water that will fulfill future needs of a National
Forest is to appropriate without use. Such reservation does not mean
that the water flows down to the ocean are unused until the Forest
Service decides otherwise; other users may put the water to use. But
these appropriators would be junior appropriators, that is, appropriators with a lesser priority to the water when the Forest Service does
decide to put the water to use. The junior appropriators have a lesser
protected water right, with a later priority date.
B. PriorityDates
The United States, acting as sovereign, obtained most of the lands
of what are now the New Mexico National Forests through the Mexican Cession. These forests were all reserved from the public domain
65. Corker, Federal-State Relations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17
Rocky Mtn. Mi. L. Inst. 579, n. 11 (1972).
66. But see Note, Appropriation By The State of Minimum Flows In New Mexico
Streams, 15 Nat. Res. J. 809, 817-18 (1975), for an interesting and convincing argument
that diversion is not an absolute requisite in appropriating water in New Mexico. The
argument is three-fold: (1) diversion served as objective proof of intent to appropriate prior
to 1907 statutory notice provisions; (2) diversion also served as a practical kind of notice no
longer required because the State Engineer now approves or disapproves every appropriation; and, (3) the assumption that uses requiring diversion result in a better allocation of
resources is no longer valid and is outdated.
67. State ex. reL State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1945).
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with fairly early reservation dates. Other lands have been acquired
through exchange or purchase and brought within the National
Forest boundaries. Many of these acquisitions were of old Spanish
land grants, e.g., the J. J. Lobato Land Grant on the Carson National
Forest.
The fact that there is presently only one case of a reserved forest
water right 6 8 affecting private rights is an argument repeatedly made
by federal officials to minimize the uncertainties created by the doctrine. Yet one may wonder if the instances will increase as the
amount of unappropriated water decreases. Very recently, a complaint has been filed in the United States District Court of Oregon by
the United States,6 9 seeking a declaratory judgment to determine
water rights on the Williamson River, and seeking to enjoin those
private uses that are impairing its use on federal lands. The lands
involved are the Klamath Forest National Wildlife Refuge, formerly
part of the Klamath Indian Reservation, which was transferred to the
United States in 1958 for the creation of a migratory bird refuge;
other parcels on the Williamson which were acquired from private
owners and now are part of the Winema National Forest; and reserved lands now part of the Deschutes, the Fremont, and the
Umpqua National Forests.
In the above complaint, the United States asserts that priority
dates of previous owners are tacked-on for its acquired lands. Among
other things, the Government also asserts that if a federal reservation
is created from a preexisting federal reservation, the priority date of
its water rights is the earlier reservation date.
New Mexico appropriation law allows a tacking-on of priority
dates when the land and its water rights are sold." 0 Since water
rights of acquired lands are subject to State law, it would seem a
similar problem in New Mexico should be resolved in favor of the
Government's position, when the water is put to the same use as it
had been by the previous landowner. However, a new use by the
Government might be limited if it was not a high-ranking beneficial
use as recognized by the State.
The latter assertion of the Government concerning the tacking-on
of reservation priority dates is not quite so clear. The Eagle County
case indicates that water
is reserved according to the original
"nature" of the reserve. 7 The nature of an Indian reservation and
that of a National Forest reservation are two different thinigs. It
68.
69.
70.
71.

Glenn v. United States, supra note 64,
United States v. Adair, Civil Case No. 75-914 (D. Ore.).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 75-5-21 through 22 (1953).
401 U.S. at 523.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 1e

would seem that a priority date of the latter reservation is more
practical. The Indian reservation, by its nature, may have required
more or less water than is necessary for the Forest reservation. Ifthe
Forest requires more water than the Indian reservation did, a priority
date as of the date of the Indian reservation would perhaps serve to
divest previously vested rights. If it requires less, then the "difference" serves to greater protect junior rights.
The question of tacking-on priority dates has arisen in one of the
two current New Mexico adjudications concerning Forest Service
uses. 72 In the Mimbres Valley adjudication, the court found that,
"uses necessary for military purposes on the lands of the Ft. Bayard
Military Reservation ...when transferred to the Department of
Agriculture on January 2, 1941, became forest purpose uses with the
original priority date of April 16, 1869; and all other uses originated
thereafter were for forest purposes with a priority date of January 2,
1941 .173 It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court
has found against the Federal Government on this issue. 4
As noted above, the reservation doctrine does not apply to acquired lands. But what happens when acquired land has a valuable
water source that can be diverted to adjoining reserved land, all
within the Forest boundary? The reserved priority date should not
apply because the water does not arise on land that is reserved,
therefore the priority date should be the date the water was put to
use. Conversely, what if the water is diverted from the reserved land
to acquired land? That is, suppose land is acquired for a potential
campground site. Later the water source on the acquired land proves
insufficient and additional water is diverted from reserved land within the same Forest to the acquired land. What priority date applies?
Arizona v. California indicates that the water is to be used on the
reservation in order to obtain a reservation date priority? a priority
date as of its use should apply here also.
C. Instream Flows and the Purposes Argument
Closely related to the beneficial use and priority date issues is the
issue of "instream flows," or "minimum flows." The Forest Service
contends that it is environmentally beneficial to maintain instream
flows of water in a water course-to preserve stream quality and life,
72. State of New Mexico ex. rel. Civil No. 9780 (N.M. D. Ct., filed Nov. 2, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Red River]; Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, Civil No. 6326
(6th N.M. J.D. Ct., filed Mar. 21, 1966) [hereinafter cited asMimbres Valley].
73. Order Sustaining objections and Modifying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of the Special Master, Conclusion of Law No. 5, Mimbres Valley, supra note 72.
74. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), where a military reservation had been
transferred to the Ft. Mohave Indian reservation.
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for fire protection, and for its aesthetic value. This raises several
related questions: (1) is the maintenance of instream flows one of
the original purposes for which National Forests were created; (2)
does the maintenance of instream flows reflect the nature of a National Forest; and, (3) are instream flows included as a reserved water
right? If not a reserved right, then instream flows are subject to the
State law of appropriation. As it stands, the maintenance of instream
flows is not recognized as a beneficial use by New Mexico law. However, closely related are the recognized recreational uses and a recognized beneficial use in the preservation of fish for fishing purposes." 5
If recognized as a reserved right, the next question is how much
water is required for instream flows? In quantifying its water rights,
the Forest Service contends that while it is best to maintain a high
level of instream flow, a certain minimal flow should be recognized
and will be acceptable. In Mimbres Valley, for instance, the Forest
Service suggested a minimum of 2.0 cubic feet per second, meanwhile maintaining that 7.0 to 9.0 cubic feet per second would probably be a reasonable instream flow.
Whether reserved rights include instream flows is an issue that
should be resolved by the United States Supreme Court. At least one
state's district court has resolved the issue in favor of the Forest
Service. 7 6 But other state courts have not been so inclined, particularly New Mexico's. 7 I It has been argued persuasively that the
original purpose of the National Forest did not include instream
flows, or at any rate, instream flows for the protection of fish and
game.
The Organic Act 7 8 is perhaps the first actual statement of Forest
purposes. Therein is found, "No national forest reservation shall be
established, except to improve and protect the forest within the
boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of
water flows. " (Emphasis added.) The Act does not detail what favorable conditions are, or to whom they must be favorable. It is reasonable to assume, however, from the contemporary legislative intent as
well as subsequent legislation that "favorable conditions of water
flows" were those conditions favorable to both the Forest and to the
public.
Further, it is reasonable to argue that to maintain instream flows is
75. State ex. rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1945).
76. Soderman v. Kackley, Civil Case No. 1829 (Dist. 6, Idaho 1975).
77. Red River and Mimbres Valley, supra note 72.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970) (corresponds with Act of June 4, 1897, c. 2, § 1, 30 Stat.
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to improve and protect the forest. In the Mimbres Valley litigation,
the Federal Government argued that the term "forest" includes
"more than just the trees. It includes the entire ecosystem-the trees,
the bushes and other plant life, the decaying leaves, needles, etc., the
fish and wildlife, etc., that make up the forest community."' 7 9
The Government has also argued that early forest reservation acts
and commentary on those acts suggest that instream flows is an
original purpose for which reserved water rights ought to exist. It has
been noted that the early geological surveys of areas that were to
become National Forest pointed out that "pure crystal" quality of
the streams and the "abundance of fine trout."8 0 Further, in an act
prior to the Creative Act of 1891,81 Congress reserved forest lands in
California and provided for the "preservation from injury ...natural
curiosities or wonders within said reservation, and their retention in
their natural condition." 8 2
New Mexico has argued that the Organic Act authorized only two
purposes for which National Forests were created, citing the relevant
portion of the Act:
No national forest shall be established except to improve and protect
the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
*83
States ....
The two purposes recognized by the State are the protection of the
watershed to ensure dependable water supplies for downstream
appropriators, and protection of the forest in order to secure an
adequate and continuous supply of timber. 8 4 Apparently the State
ignores the first purpose elaborated in the Act and expounded by the
Government, to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries. The purposes they do recognize are preceded by the conjunction "or" in the Act, which indicates that at least three general
purposes were intended.
It was not until 1960 that "multiple use" became the official
credo of the National Forests. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield
79. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Special Master's Report, p. 8,
filed by United States in Mimbres Valley, supra note 72.
80. First, Second and Third Annual Reports of the United States Geological Survey of
the Territories for the years 1867, 1868, and 1869, 182 (1873).
81. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 24, 26, 26 Stat. 1103.
82. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1263, 26 Stat. 651.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970).
84. Memorandum of Law Submitted Pursuant to the Court's Pre-Trial Order of Nov. 12,
1975, in Red River, supra note 72.
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sets out the purposes of a Forest: outdoor recreation, range,

timber, watershed, wildlife and fish purposes. Yet, the Forest Service
had long administered the National Forests under a multiple use
policy. Nothing new was added by the Act except a Congressional
stamp of approval. As early as 1891, the Chief Forester stated that:
Forest management such as contemplated, does not destroy natural
beauty, does not decrease but gives opportunity to increase the
game, and tends to promote the greatest development of the country, giving regular and steady employment, furnishing continuous
supplies, and making8 6each acre to its full duty in whatever direction
it can produce most.

And the following language appears as early as 1906 in the Forest
Service Use Book:
In the administration of the forest reserves it must be clearly borne
in mind that all land is to be devoted to its most productive use for
the permanent good of the whole people, and not for the temporary
benefit of individuals or companies ... and where conflicting inter-

ests must be reconciled the question will always be decided from the
standpoint of the greatest good of the greatest number in the long
run. 7

Finally, the Senate and House Reports on the Multiple Use Act make
clear that the Act gave Congressional approval to a long continued
practice:
On the same day that the administration of the national forests was
given to the Secretary of Agriculture by the act of February 1, 1905
(16 U.S.C. 472), Secretary of Agriculture Wilson directed that questions of policy in their management should be decided from the
standpoint of "the greatest good of the greatest number in the long
run." Enactment of the bill would continue this policy. The administration of the national forests has long been under the policies of
multiple use and sustained yield. 8 8 (Emphasis added.)
It would appear that the original purposes for which the Forests
were created were broad indeed. If that argument is sound, the decisions in the Mimbres Valley and Red River adjudications are clearly
erroneous in their conclusions against the Government on instream
85. 16 U.S.C. § § 528-31 (1970) (corresponds with Act of June 12, 1960, P.L. 86-517,
§ 1, 74 Stat. 215).
86. Report of the Chief of the Division of Forestry, 224-25 (1891).
87. Use Books for 1906, 15-17 (1907).
88. H.R. Rep. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960); S. Rep. No. 1407, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1960).
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flows.' 9 Prior to the decision by the District Court in the Mimbres
case, the Special Master had ruled in favor of the Federal Government's reserved rights to instream flows. But he had distinguished
instream flows that are upstream from private appropriators. Finding
that no private appropriators were upstream from the portions of the
river where instream flows were sought, the Master found in favor of
instream flows. However, the distinction made should make no difference; instream flows should or should not be valid reserved rights
irrespective of their geographical location in respect to private
appropriators. 90
On the one hand, some observers refuse to believe that Congress
originally intended Forest Service purposes to include instream
flows. Some, even, find it incredible that Congress made an implicit
reservation of any water for future uses. On the other hand, some
find it hard to believe that Congress could foresee fully appropriated
waters threatening the life of fish, game, and stream quality-not to
mention the whole natural forest cycle. Perhaps the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, esteemed conservationist, will help soothe
the frustration of the latter group: "The man who would so handle
his forest as to cause erosion and to injure stream flow must be not
only educated, but he must be controlled." 9 1
The question of whether special use permits on National Forests
are entitled to reserved rights turns on whether the use of water by
permittees was an original purpose of the Forest reservation. Stockwater grazing uses are particularly at issue. The Special Master in the
Red River9 2 adjudication concluded that they were not. As a practical matter the only effect of this holding would appear to be that
the Forest Service cannot increase its present permittee uses without
the permittee appropriating the water under State law. The State
Engineer Office has apparently conceded the futility of attempting
to adjudicate present permittee water rights. 9 3
89. Order Sustaining Objectives and Modifying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of the Special Master's Report, Conclusion of Law, No. 11, Mimbres Valley, supra note 72.
90. But see Special Master's Report, Conclusion of Law No. 17, Red River, supra note
72. See also Conclusion of Law No. 16, where the Special Master concluded that the United
States had no right to instream flows because that use, "is not a reasonable use within the
meaning of the riparian principle of reasonable use." But the question should not turn on
types of water law applied, riparian "reasonable" use or appropriative "beneficial" use.
Once the court concedes that the federal government has the power to reserve water, the
distinction of types of law is irrelevant because where there is a conflict between federal law
and state law, federal law should supercede. Rather, the issue is whether the government
reserved water rights for that particular use, and to resolve that question the court must
determine what the original Forest purposes were, Which it did in Conclusion of Law No. 4.
91. Report of the National Conservation Commission of 1909, at 7.
92. Special Master's Report, Conclusion of Law no. 12, Red River.
93. Proposed Order Modifying the Master's Report, sent to the District Court by the
State Engineer, Mimbres Valley. The following appears at pp. 3-4:
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Thus it appears that in New Mexico present water rights for grazing uses would be protected; but under State law, not under the
implied reservation doctrine. Whether or not these cattle grazing
water uses were part of the original purpose of the Forest reservations is a subject of great debate. The Forest Service had assumed
that Arizona v. California had settled the issue; therein the Court
approved the Special Master's finding of original purposes including
grazing permittee use. Cattle grazing was an original use of the
National Forests, but it would seem that the only water use contemplated was use by cattle directly out of the natural stream or
ponds, reminiscent of more pastoral times. The Granger-Thye Act, 9 4
authorizing special use permits for cattle grazing, was not enacted
until 1950. However, a strong argument can be made that grazing
was an original purpose, given the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield
Act 9 I and the legislative reports on its enactment. 9 6 Given the
State's concession that present grazing rights not be adjudicated, the
only practical effect is that the Forest cannot reserve future uses for
its grazing permittees. But even under appropriative law it would
appear that one permittee may transfer the water rights to a subsequent permittee on the same grazing allotment.
The majority of the remaining water uses by special use permittees
would undoubtedly be considered as within the original purposes of
the National Forests, i.e., recreational, domestic, mineral, milling,
etc. Again, the primary issue is "original purpose" of the reservation.
The question of purpose is crucial to the conflict between the
reservation doctrine and the appropriative law of New Mexico. If one
adheres to the proprietary basis of the reservation doctrine the question is whether the Federal Government actually reserved its proprietary interests for that particular use of the water, that particular
purpose. If so, an implied notice was given the subsequent appro... With regard to the various uses made by permittees New Mexico would be
willing to have the rights arising therefrom adjudicated jointly and severally to
the United States and the permittees. As the Court has held, it is our view that
the rights are appropriative in nature, but at the same time New Mexico would

not want to become involved in a dispute between the United States and its
permittees over the ownership of improvements, including water rights, upon
the termination of given permits. Accordingly, we would suggest that the
rights be given a single appropriative priority. On this point we have no reason
to doubt that all such stockwater uses are valid rights vested before 1907, so
we would propose adjudicating January, 1907 priority dates to all of them,
unless the United States can, within a reasonable time, establish an earlier date
of initiation, by affidavit or otherwise.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 580(1) (1965) (corresponds with Act of April 24, 1950, c. 97, § 19, 64

Stat. 88).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1968).
96. H. Rep. No. 1551; S. Rep. No. 1407, supra note 88.
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priators and their rights are junior to the Federal Government. If not,
their rights are vested under New Mexico appropriative law. However, if one is a proponent of the supremacy basis of the reservation
doctrine, then the question is whether the Federal law-such as the
Creative Act, the Organic Act, and the Multiple Use Act-is in conflict with the State appropriative law. To resolve this requires an
analysis of the purposes of the act. If there is a conflict, the conflict
should be resolved in favor of the Federal Government.
In short, the issue is not whether the Government can reserve
water for instream flows or special use permits, but whether it in fact
did reserve water for instream flows or special use permits. And if so,
when? Or in other words, the question of instream flows or any
other use of water by the Forest Service should not hinge on whether
the State has authorized such use, but on whether the Federal
Government, and particularly Congress, has authorized such use.
Once that determination is made in favor of the Government, the
next issue is whether it is Constitutional under the property clause,
supremacy clause, commerce clause, etc.
D. Compensation
Perhaps the foremost problem concerning the reservation doctrine
is that of compensation. Professor Trelease has concluded that the
reservation doctrine is a financial doctrine, and:
... The only difference resulting from reliance on the reservation
doctrine instead of on a more basic federal power is that in some
cases where the water is taken from persons who have previously put
The reservait to use the United States need not pay for the taking.
9
tion doctrine is a financial doctrine and nothing more. 7
A reservation right means that the Government need not compensate
for an impaired right junior to the reservation right.
The Forest Service position is a we'll cross that bridge when we get
to it stance. The Forest Service Manual calls for an analysis of any
private rights that might be impaired by proposed Forest plans, 9 8
and a consideration for the needs of other water users. 9 9 Some have
suggested that the Forest Service is relying on the fact that only one
impaired water right has surfaced thus far, that of the Glenn case.
The underlying rational, however, is that a position which sanctions
compensation will lead to a rash of "impaired rights"; a lot of
appropriators who do not use their full measure of water presently,
will begin to closely safeguard their quantities.
97. Trelease, NWC Study at 147m.
98. Forest Service Manual, at § 2541.14.
99. Forest Service Manual, at § 2541.02.
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In light of the instream flows problem, suppose that a private
appropriator attempts to transfer his point of diversion or location of
use to a point which threatens instream flows; this would most likely
be the transfer of a use location presently downstream from Forest
instream flows, to a use location upstream from Forest instream
flows. Under the reservation doctrine, assuming that the private
appropriator has a priority date later than the reservation date, the
appropriator's right to transfer his point of diversion is negated. Yet
he need not be compensated for his loss under the implied reservation doctrine. However the Forest Service Manual makes clear that,
"The effect of the proposed National Forest System water use on
present non-National Forest users who are dependent upon water for
their livelihood will be fully considered to ensure that any unnecessary depletion of their existing water use is avoided." '1 0 There has
been no showing that this policy has not been followed in New
Mexico.
Most of the recommended legislation at the national level is in
support of some type of compensation for vested junior uses that are
impaired. 1 0 One study by Tarlock and Tippy suggests that future
large-scale uses will most likely be Congressionally approved and will
provide compensation measures.' 02 The Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act' 03 provisions are relied upon to substantiate such an outlook.
Perhaps this is a valid assessment of large-scale uses, but what happens to those localized uses that don't "come off the top of a 363
million acre foot tank(?)"' 04, The Forest Service regulations provide
that each Forest Supervisor is responsible for projected projects on
his particular forest, and consequently, projected water uses.' 0 1 The
Regional Forester may review or have to approve certain projects
that may be controversial or have a substantial regional impact.
Rarely does a decision go beyond the regional level to the Washington office. As such, the localized uses do not have the protection
envisioned by Tarlock and Tippy.
Another argument that has been made is that the United States
Government, "could and should be estopped from asserting its
superior water rights without paying just compensation for the right
taken."' 06 (Emphasis added.) The author lists four elements of
100.
101.
102.
(1970).
103.
104.
105.
106.
L. Rev.

ForestService Manual, at § 2541.14.
Legislation listed at supra note 3.
Tarlock and Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 707
16 U.S.C. § 1271-1278 (1970).
Trelease, NWCStudy, at 120.
Forest Service Manual, at § 1251.04.
Note, Limiting Federal Reserved Water Rights Through the State Courts, 1972 Utah
, Can the Government be Estopped?, 10 Land &
48, 56 (1972). But see
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equitable estoppel and applies them to the implied reservation doctrine. The fourth element cited is that the injured private appropriator, "must have relied to his detriment upon the actions of the
party to be estopped. "' 0 7 The author concludes that a taking of
water rights without compensation would be detrimental to the
private appropriator. 0 " But a court might have to balance the detrimental reliance with the beneficial reliance. A court might well consider the National Forest contribution to watershed management and
production, which has allowed more and more water users to construe new ways of putting water to beneficial use. Does the detriment outweigh the benefit? In equity, this writer thinks not. On the
other hand, should one man pay for the good of all? Finally, it is
seriously doubted whether the United States would be estopped in
this type of situation.
Another farfetched possibility might be to utilize the Federal Tort
Claims Act' I 9 in an attempt to recover for property damage. There
are at least four problems with its utilization, however. One is that in
order to recover under the Act negligence must be shown on the part
of a federal employee. Second, the federal employee must have acted
within the scope of his employment. Third, an exception is made for
those employee actions that are "discretionary" in nature.' '0
Fourth, there is a question whether any compensable property injury
would exist.
If Forest Service officials fail to consider the needs of other water
users, or to ensure that any "unnecessary depletion of their existing
water use" is avoided, then these officials are acting at variance with
their Manual. 11 and perhaps negligently. Applicable state law controls as to the elements of actionable negligence. The presence of
such Manual provisions may serve to show a duty owed to the nonForest user; non-compliance is perhaps a breach of that duty. Assuming an injury to property, and that the employees were acting within
the scope of their employment, then the requirements of the Act are
met. The chances of succeeding on these arguments are practically
nil, since the "discretionary actions" exception safeguards any
administrative decisions concerning Forest Service water use.
Assuming that it can be shown that Forest Service officials acted
within the scope of their employment, acted negligently toward the
Nat. Res. Div. J.
(1972); and, United States v. E. W. Savage and Son, 343 F. Supp. 123
(S.D. D.C. 1972).
107. Note, Limiting FederalReserved Water Rights Through the State Courts, at 59.
108. Id.

109. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1969).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1969).
111. ForestService Manual, at § 2541.14.
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non-Forest user, and that their actions were not discretionary, the
final hurdle would be a showing of a compensable property injury.
Weil set forth a much-cited statement on property rights in water:
.. The substantial property right recognized by the law is the usufruct of the stream-the right to the flow and use of the natural
resource, or "water right" in the natural supply, and this is real
property, however obtained. A right of access to the natural resource
is essential to the enjoyment of this usufruct.' 12
Apparently the New Mexico Supreme Court agrees that a water right
is a property right.' I I
Federal rights proponents such as Kiechel I I have argued that the
Federal Government is the owner of the water on its reserved lands.
Under appropriative law and the implied reservation doctrine, a nonForest use has to commence prior to the creation of the reservation
in order to be a fully protected right. But that is not to say that the
latter right should go unprotected. Both rights should be compensated for; it is the water right that is the property interest. The issue
of earlier or later priority should be applicable only in determining
the amount of compensation, or damages under some waiver-ofsovereign-immunity act such as the Federal Tort Claims Act.
E. Quantification
The state of New Mexico, like the rest of the Western states, is a
proponent of quantification of Federal Government reserved rights.
This means that all contemplated uses for the federal reserved lands,
such as National Forests, should be evaluated and recorded so that
state planners and private parties contemplating investment in water
use can rely on those figures.' ' 5
The Region 3 policy is the general policy outlined in the Forest
Service Manual and reflective of a recent change made in light of the
Eagle County decision. The Manual states that:
In cases where the reservation principle is applicable, the proper
State water agency will be notified of current and foreseeable future
National Forest system water requirements in a manner to be developed with each State, on a State-by-State basis.' 16
...

The Forest Service provided the State Engineer Office with the present and projected figures on June 11, 1975.1 ' 7
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, § 442 (3rd ed. 1911).
Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 68 N.M. 61, 66, 358 P.2d 626, 629 (1961).
W.Kiechel, supra note 29.
PLLRC, One Third of the Nation's Land, Recommendation 56, at 156.
ForestService Manual, at § 2541.03.
Interview with Region 3 Hydrologists, supra note 52.
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The Region 3 figures tend to support the de minimus argument set
forth by several federal agencies. Part of that argument is that present and projected Federal uses are so minimal in comparison to
private uses that their effect is also minimal. But that argument begs
the question. What happens to those private rights that are affected
by reservation uses?
The decision in Eagle County upon cursory analysis, would seem
to be a great boon to the State in allowing it to adjudicate Forest
Service uses in accordance with State law under the McCarran
Amendment, perhaps forcing the Forest Service to quantify its
claims. However the Supreme Court specifically recognized the existence of federal reserved rights under Arizona v. California, and
allowed for the review of any decision dealing with those rights. In
reality then, "any state judicial theory concerning the reservation
doctrine that is to survive the appellate process in the United States
Supreme Court must at least recognize the existence of the federal
government's reserved rights." ' 1 8
At any rate, New Mexico and other states have argued that "by
virtue of the McCarran Amendment the United States had waived its
immunity, consented to suit in state water rights adjudications, and
waived its defense that state law, especially the statutory requirements in adjudication suits, was inapplicable." 1 9 In the Mimbres
Valley adjudication, the Special Master and the District Judge
approved that argument. The Idaho Supreme Court had reached the
same conclusion earlier.' 20 That court held that the United States,
when made a party to a general adjudication, must quantify all its
rights from the source including those based upon the reservation
doctrine and intended for future use. The decision was the first from
a court of last resort to deal with quantification and to hold that the
United States must quantify.
Even if the Forest Service's quantified uses are adjudicated on
each State surface-water basin, it is hard to determine what real gain
is made thereby. In the Mimbres Valley case, the figures provided by
the Gila National Forest show a present use of 91.18 acre-feet per
year, and a projected additional use of 855.40 acre-feet per year on
118. Note, Limiting Federal Reserved Water Rights Through the State Courts, 1972 Utah
L. Rev. 48, 55 (1972). See also United States District Court in and for the County of Eagle,
401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
119. Memorandum from the State Engineer Office to District Judge Hodges, Proposed

Order Modifying the Master's Report, dated March 5, 1976, at p. 4, Mimbres Valley, supra
note 72.
120. Avondale Irrigation District v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 96 Id. 1, 523 P.2d 818

(1974).
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the Mimbres River basin.' 2' Even discounting plans for the Noonday Reservoir, stockwater use figures alone show an increase from
74.45 acre-feet to an additional 507.55 acre-feet.' 22 Is this abnormal increase, compared to State-wide Forest figures, only coincidental to the fact that this was the first adjudication attempting to
quantify Forest Service reserved rights in New Mexico? This writer
thinks not. The same type of increase is reflected in the Red River
basin figures provided in the Red River adjudication.
Perhaps inflated figures wil be resorted to by Forest officials as
insurance that sufficient water is retained under the reservation doctrine. Does this promote the most economical and efficient use of
water any more than non-quantification? One of the authors of the
Public Land Law Review study observed:
...Few persons, I think, could sustain the burden of showing that
the Government's estimates of future requirements were unreasonable. If you wanted to start a run on the aspirin market, you would
announce that everyone has six months to establish his next fortyyear requirement for aspirin. And a federal agency whose activities
depend on federal laws and money appropriations subject to change
cannot estimate its forty-year requirements any better than you can
estimate your forty-year aspirin requirements.' 23
The Department of Justice has proposed federal legislation aimed
at quanitfying federal reserved uses.' 24 The bill calls for an inventory of all reserved, appropriative, and other water rights, to be
prepared by the head of each federal agency within five (5) years
after passage of the act. Within six (6) years after passage, the Secretary of the Interior is to submit to each appropriate state authority a
single inventory of all Federal water rights within that state, which
inventory is to be published in the Federal Register. The inventory is
to be updated annually. The bill also provides for judicial review, in
the appropriate United States District Court, of the rights listed in
the inventories without resorting to general adjudication proceeding.
The state or a private appropriator may seek review. Even assuming
that the bill would become law in 1976, the inventory of quantified
rights would not have to be submitted to the New Mexico State
Engineer Office until 1982. The District Judge in the Mimbres Valley
121. Interview with Region 3 Hydrologists, supra note 52. The Mimbres River basin is a
sub-basin of the Southwestern Closed Basin, a major basin in the extreme southwestern
corner of the State.
122. Id.
123. Corker, Federal-State Relations In Water Rights Adjudication and Administration,
17 Rocky Mt. MI. L. Inst. 579, 593 (1972).
124. See Kiechel, supra note 29.
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adjudication has ordered that the United States quantify its future
needs within one year.' 2 5 It will be interesting to see which inventory is submitted first, if ever-the Department of Justice's Kiechel
Bill inventory, or the Mimbres court ordered inventory.
CONCLUSION
The conflict created by the implied reservation doctrine has been
heightened by stretching it to its fullest imagined ramifications.
Much as the courts proceed on a case-by-case basis, so must the
resolution of the reservation doctrine problems proceed. Too much
analysis and conclusion has been made through a nationwide or Westwide approach. Perhaps more ad hoc analysis is needed for particular
states and particular federal reservations.
Certainly a more objective view is required. Admittedly, this
writer's view leans toward the federal position. But it started with no
particular constituency or clientele to appease. Besides, one tires of
reading page after page of pro-state analyses. Ultimately, that "objective view" will have to be provided by the United States Supreme
Court. Resolution via Congressional action has been, and will continue to be, met by federal agency resistance, and present executive
action is being hotly contested by state agencies.
New Mexico should recognize that Forest Service use is beneficial
use, even where there is no diversion. Priority dates should be given
as of the date of the reservation and successive but different-type
reservation priority dates should be tacked on. The purposes for
which the National Forests were created should include: instream
flows, permittee use, and those uses included under the revamped
"multiple use" concept. Water rights, and priority dates in particular,
for acquired lands should be administered under State law. Further,
the issue of compensation should be resolved in favor of the nonForest user because he has a protectable property right in the use of
the water. Finally, quantification would not serve to maximize
economic water utility and most likely will not limit future reserved

rights.
RICHARD A. MARQUEZ

125. Order Sustaining Objections and Modifying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the Special Master's Report, Conclusion of Law No. 12, Mimbres Valley, supra note
72.

